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Expert System Industry In China
The expert system market in individuals’s Republic of China is a quickly developing multi-billion dollar market. The roots of China’s AI advancement began in the late 1970s following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms emphasizing science and technology as the country’s main productive force.
The initial phases of China’s AI development were sluggish and encountered significant challenges due to absence of resources and talent. At the beginning China lagged the majority of Western countries in regards to AI development. A bulk of the research was led by researchers who had gotten higher education abroad. [1]
Since 2006, the government of the People’s Republic of China has progressively established a national agenda for artificial intelligence development and became one of the leading nations in artificial intelligence research study and advancement. [2] In 2016, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released its thirteenth five-year plan in which it intended to become an international AI leader by 2030. [3]
The State Council has a list of « nationwide AI groups » including fifteen China-based business, consisting of Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, SenseTime, and iFlytek. [citation required] Each business must lead the advancement of a designated specialized AI sector in China, such as facial acknowledgment, software/hardware, and speech acknowledgment. China’s rapid AI development has considerably affected Chinese society in many locations, including the socio-economic, military, and political spheres. Agriculture, transport, accommodation and food services, and manufacturing are the top industries that would be the most affected by more AI implementation.
The personal sector, university laboratories, and the armed force are working collaboratively in lots of aspects as there are couple of present existing limits. [4] In 2021, China released the Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, its very first nationwide law dealing with AI-related ethical concerns. In October 2022, the United States federal government revealed a series of export controls and trade restrictions meant to limit China’s access to advanced computer system chips for AI applications. [5] [6]
Concerns have actually been raised about the results of the Chinese government’s censorship routine on the development of generative artificial intelligence and skill acquisition with state of the nation’s demographics. [7] [8]
History
The research study and development of expert system in China started in the 1980s, with the statement by Deng Xiaoping of the value of science and innovation for China’s economic development. [3]
Late 1970s to early 2010s
Expert system research study and advancement did not begin till the late 1970s after Deng Xiaoping’s financial reforms. [3] While there was a lack of AI-related research between the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars believe this is because of the influence of cybernetics from the Soviet Union in spite of the Sino-Soviet split throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. [9] In the 1980s, a group of Chinese researchers released AI research led by Qian Xuesen and Wu Wenjun. [9] However, throughout the time, China’s society still had a typically conservative view towards AI. [9] Early AI development in China was tough so China’s federal government approached these challenges by sending Chinese scholars overseas to study AI and additional providing federal government funds for research tasks. The Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence (CAAI) was established in September 1981 and was authorized by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. [10] The very first chairman of the executive committee was Qin Yuanxun, who received a PhD in approach from Harvard University. [citation needed] In 1987, China’s first research study publication on synthetic intelligence was published by Tsinghua University. Beginning in 1993, smart automation and intelligence have belonged to China’s national innovation plan. [9]
Since the 2000s, the Chinese federal government has actually even more expanded its research study and advancement funds for AI and the variety of government-sponsored research study jobs has actually considerably increased. [3] In 2006, China announced a policy priority for the development of synthetic intelligence, which was included in the National Medium and Long Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), released by the State Council. [2] In the exact same year, expert system was also mentioned in the l lth five-year strategy. [11]
In 2011, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) established a branch in Beijing, China. [12] At very same year, the Wu Wenjun Expert System Science and Technology Award was established in honor of Chinese mathematician Wu Wenjun, and it became the greatest award for Chinese achievements in the field of synthetic intelligence. The first award event was hung on May 14, 2012. [13] In 2013, the International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) was held in Beijing, marking the first time the conference was kept in China. This occasion coincided with the Chinese federal government’s announcement of the « Chinese Intelligence Year, » a substantial turning point in China’s advancement of synthetic intelligence. [12]
Late 2010s to early 2020s
The State Council of China provided « A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan » (State Council Document [2017] No. 35) on 20 July 2017. In the file, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council urged governing bodies in China to promote the development of expert system. Specifically, the plan described AI as a tactical innovation that has actually ended up being a « focus of worldwide competitors ». [14]:2 The document advised considerable investment in a variety of strategic areas connected to AI and required close cooperation between the state and economic sectors. On the occasion of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping’s speech at the first plenary conference of the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee (CMCFDC), scholars from the National Defense University composed in the PLA Daily that the « transferability of social resources » in between economic and military ends is an important element to being a great power. [15] During the Two Sessions 2017, »synthetic intelligence plus » was proposed to be raised to a strategic level. [16] The same year witnessed the emergence of multiple application-level uses in the medical field according to reports. [17] Furthermore, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) developed their AI processor chip research study laboratory in Nanjing, and introduced their very first AI expertise chip, Cambrian. [citation needed]
In 2018, Xinhua News Agency, in partnership with Tencent’s subsidiary Sogou, released its very first synthetic intelligence-generated news anchor. [18] [19] [20]
In 2018, the State Council allocated $2.1 billion for an AI industrial park in Mentougou district. [21] In order to accomplish this the State Council specified the requirement for enormous talent acquisition, theoretical and practical advancements, along with public and personal investments. [14] A few of the mentioned motivations that the State Council provided for pursuing its AI technique consist of the potential of artificial intelligence for commercial transformation, better social governance and keeping social stability. [14] As of the end of 2020, Shanghai’s Pudong District had 600 AI companies throughout foundational, technical, and application layers, with related markets valued at around 91 billion yuan. [22]
In 2019, the application of expert system expanded to numerous fields such as quantum physics, geography, and medical research study. With the introduction of large language designs (LLMs), at the start of 2020, Chinese scientists started establishing their own LLMs. One such example is the multimodal large model called ‘Zidongtaichu.’ [23]
The Beijing Academy of Expert system released China’s first big scale pre-trained language model in 2022. [24] [25]:283
In November 2022, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), Ministry of Industry and Infotech, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly released the regulations concerning deepfakes, which became reliable in January 2023. [26]
In July 2023, Huawei launched its version 3.0 of its Pangu LLM. [27]
In July 2023, China released its Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services. [28]:96 A draft proposal on standard generative AI services security requirements, consisting of specs for information collection and design training was provided in October 2023. [28]:96
Also in October 2023, the Chinese government released its Global AI Governance Initiative, which frames its AI policy as part of a Neighborhood of Common Destiny and aims to construct AI policy discussion with establishing countries. [29] [28]:93 The Initiative has actually revealed issue over AI security threats, consisting of abuse of information or making use of AI by terrorists. [28]:93
In 2024, Spamouflage, an online disinformation and propaganda project of the Ministry of Public Security, started utilizing news anchors created with generative expert system to provide fake news clips. [18]
In March 2024, Premier Li Qiang introduced the AI+ Initiative, which intends to incorporate AI into China’s real economy. [28]:95
In May 2024, the Cyberspace Administration of China revealed that it rolled out a large language model trained on Xi Jinping Thought. [30]
According to the 2024 report from the International Data Corporation (IDC), Baidu AI Cloud holds China’s largest LLM market share with 19.9 percent and US$ 49 million in revenue over the in 2015. This was followed by SenseTime, with 16 percent market share, and by Zhipu AI, as the 3rd biggest. The 4th and fifth were Baichuan and the Hong-Kong noted AI business 4Paradigm respectively. [31] Baichuan, Zhipu AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax were praised by financiers as China’s brand-new « AI Tigers ». [32] In April 2024, 117 generative AI designs had actually been approved by the Chinese federal government. [33]
As of 2024, numerous Chinese innovation firms such as Zhipu AI and Bytedance have actually launched AI video-generation tools to rival OpenAI’s Sora. [34]
Chronology of significant AI-related policies
Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Science and Technology Ministry of Industry and Infotech
Government objectives
According to a February 2019 publication by the Center for a New American Security, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping – thinks that being at the leading edge of AI innovation will be important to the future of worldwide military and economic power competition. [35] By 2025, the State Council goes for China to make basic contributions to basic AI theory and to strengthen its place as a worldwide leader in AI research. Further, the State Council goes for AI to end up being « the main driving force for China’s industrial updating and financial improvement » by this time. [14] By 2030, the State Council aims to have China be the global leader in the advancement of synthetic intelligence theory and technology. The State Council declares that China will have developed a « mature new-generation AI theory and technology system. » [14]
According to academics Karen M. Sutter and Zachary Arnold, the Chinese government « seeks to meld state preparation and control while some operational versatility for firms. In this context, China’s AI companies are hybrid gamers. The state guides their activity, funds, and shields them from foreign competition through domestic market protections, developing uneven advantages as they expand offshore. » [36]
The CCP’s fourteenth five-year strategy declared AI as a top research study top priority and ranks AI first amongst « frontier markets » that the Chinese government aims to concentrate on through 2035. [3] The AI industry is a strategic sector typically supported by China’s government guidance funds. [37]:167
Research and development
Chinese public AI funding primarily concentrated on advanced and applied research. [38] The government funding also supported multiple AI R&D in the economic sector through endeavor capitals that are backed by the state. [38] Much analytic firm research revealed that, while China is massively investing in all aspects of AI advancement, facial recognition, biotechnology, quantum computing, medical intelligence, and self-governing vehicles are AI sectors with the most attention and financing. [39]
According to national assistance on developing China’s modern industrial advancement zones by the Ministry of Science and Technology, there are fourteen cities and one county chosen as an experimental development zone. [40] Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces have the most AI development in experimental locations. However, the focus of AI R&D differed depending on cities and regional commercial development and ecosystem. For example, Suzhou, a city with a longstanding strong manufacturing market, greatly concentrates on automation and AI infrastructure while Wuhan focuses more on AI applications and the education sector. [40] In connection with universities, tech companies, and nationwide ministries, Shenzhen and Hangzhou each co-founded generative AI laboratories. [25]:282
In 2016 and 2017, Chinese groups won the leading reward at the Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge, a global competitors for computer system vision systems. [41] Much of these systems are now being integrated into China’s domestic surveillance network. [42]
Interdisciplinary collaborations play an essential function in China’s AI R&D, consisting of academic-corporate cooperation, public-private collaborations, and global partnerships and jobs with corporate-government partnerships are the most common. [1] China ranked in the top three around the world following the United States and the European Union for the overall number of peer-reviewed AI publications that are produced under a corporate-academic partnership in between 2015 and 2019. [43] Besides, according to an AI index report, China surpassed the U.S. in 2020 in the total number of international AI-related journal citations. [43] In regards to AI-related R&D, China-based peer-reviewed AI documents are mainly sponsored by the government. In May 2021, China’s Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence released the world’s largest pre-trained language design (WuDao). [44]
As of 2023, 47% of the world’s top AI scientists had actually finished their undergraduate studies in China. [28]:101
According to scholastic Angela Huyue Zhang, publishing in 2024, while the Chinese federal government has been proactive in controling AI services and enforcing commitments on AI companies, the overall method to its regulation is loose and demonstrates a pro-growth policy beneficial to China’s AI industry. [28]:96 In July 2024, the government opened its first algorithm registration center in Beijing. [45]
Population
China’s big population generates an enormous quantity of accessible information for business and scientists, which uses a crucial advantage in the race of big data. As of 2024 [update], China has the world’s largest number of internet users, producing substantial amounts of information for artificial intelligence and AI applications. [46]:18
Facial recognition
Facial recognition is among the most commonly used AI applications in China. Collecting these big quantities of data from its locals assists more train and expand AI capabilities. China’s market is not just favorable and important for corporations to more AI R&D but also offers tremendous financial prospective drawing in both international and domestic firms to join the AI market. The extreme advancement of the details and communication innovation (ICT) industry and AI chipsets over the last few years are 2 examples of this. [47] China has ended up being the world’s largest exporter of facial recognition technology, according to a January 2023 Wired report. [48]
Censorship and material controls
In April 2023, [49] the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued draft steps mentioning that tech business will be obligated to guarantee AI-generated material maintains the ideology of the CCP consisting of Core Socialist Values, prevents discrimination, respects copyright rights, and safeguards user information. [50] [25]:278 Under these draft procedures, business bear legal obligation for training information and content produced through their platforms. [25]:278 In October 2023, the Chinese federal government mandated that generative artificial intelligence-produced content might not « incite subversion of state power or the overthrowing of the socialist system. » [51] Before releasing a large language model to the public, business should look for approval from the CAC to accredit that the model declines to respond to certain concerns connecting to political ideology and criticism of the CCP. [8] [52] Questions related to politically sensitive topics such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre or contrasts between Xi Jinping and Winnie the Pooh should be declined. [52]
In 2023, in-country access was obstructed to Hugging Face, a company that preserves libraries containing training information sets typically used for large language models. [8] A subsidiary of individuals’s Daily, the main newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, supplies regional companies with training information that CCP leaders consider allowable. [8] In 2024, the People’s Daily launched a LLM-based tool called Easy Write. [53]
Microsoft has cautioned that the Chinese federal government utilizes generative expert system to interfere in foreign elections by spreading disinformation and provoking discussions on divisive political concerns. [54] [55] [56]
The Chinese expert system model DeepSeek has actually been reported to decline to answer concerns associating with things about the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre, persecution of Uyghurs, contrasts between Xi Jinping and Winnie the Pooh or human rights in China. [57] [58] [59]
Impact
Economic effect
Most firms [who?] hold positive views about AI’s financial influence on China’s long-term economic development. In the past, standard industries in China have actually had problem with the boost in labor expenses due to the growing aging population in China and the low birth rate. With the release of AI, functional expenses are expected to decrease while a boost in effectiveness creates earnings growth. [60] Some highlight the importance of a clear policy and governmental support in order to overcome adoption barriers consisting of costs and lack of appropriately trained technical skills and AI awareness. [61] However, there are issues about China’s deepening earnings inequality and the ever-expanding imbalanced labor market in China. Low- and medium-income workers might be the most negatively affected by China’s AI advancement because of rising needs for laborers with innovative abilities. [61] Furthermore, China’s financial development may be disproportionately divided as a majority of AI-related industrial development is concentrated in coastal regions rather than inland. [61]
A prominent choice by the Beijing Internet Court has ruled that AI-generated content is entitled to copyright protection. [28]:98
Military impact
China seeks to construct a « first-rate » armed force by « intelligentization » with a particular focus on the usage of unmanned weapons and expert system. [62] [63] It is researching different kinds of air, land, sea, and undersea autonomous automobiles. In the spring of 2017, a civilian Chinese university with ties to the military demonstrated an AI-enabled swarm of 1,000 uninhabited aerial lorries at an airshow. A media report released later on showed a computer simulation of a similar swarm formation finding and ruining a rocket launcher. [4]:23 Open-source publications showed that China is also developing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations. [64] [4]:27 Chinese advancement of military AI is mostly affected by China’s observation of U.S. plans for defense innovation and fears of a broadening « generational gap » in comparison to the U.S. armed force. Similar to U.S. military ideas, China aims to utilize AI for making use of large chests of intelligence, generating a common operating image, and accelerating battleground decision-making. [64] [4]:12 -14 The Chinese Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) is thought about China’s reaction to the U.S. Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) technique, which looks for to incorporate sensing units and weapons with AI and a vigorous network. [65] [66]
Twelve classifications of military applications of AI have actually been determined: UAVs, USVs, UUVs, UGVs, intelligent munitions, smart satellites, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) software application, automated cyber defense software application, automated cyberattack software, choice assistance, software application, automated missile launch software application, and cognitive electronic warfare software. [67]
China’s management of its AI environment contrasts with that of the United States. [4]:6 In basic, couple of boundaries exist in between Chinese commercial business, university lab, the military, and the central government. As an outcome, the Chinese federal government has a direct ways of guiding AI development priorities and accessing innovation that was ostensibly established for civilian purposes. To even more reinforce these ties the Chinese federal government developed a Military-Civil Fusion Development Commission which is intended to speed the transfer of AI innovation from business companies and research organizations to the military in January 2017. [2] [4]:19 In addition, the Chinese government is leveraging both lower barriers to data collection and lower expenses of information labeling to produce the big databases on which AI systems train. [68] According to one estimate, China is on track to have 20% of the world’s share of data by 2020, with the possible to have over 30% by 2030. [64] [4]:12
China’s centrally directed effort is buying the U.S. AI market, in companies working on militarily appropriate AI applications, potentially granting it legal access to U.S. innovation and copyright. [69] Chinese endeavor capital investment in U.S. AI companies in between 2010 and 2017 totaled an estimated $1.3 billion. [70] [64] In September 2022, the U.S. Biden administration issued an executive order to avoid foreign investments, « especially those from competitor or adversarial nations, » from purchasing U.S. innovation companies, due to U.S. nationwide security concerns. [71] [72] The order covers fields of U.S. innovations in which Chinese government has actually been investing, including « microelectronics, expert system, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, [and] sophisticated tidy energy. » [71] [72]
In 2024, researchers from the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences were reported to have actually developed a military tool utilizing Llama, which Meta Platforms stated was unapproved due to its design use prohibition for military functions. [73] [74]
Academia
Although in 2004, Peking University presented the first academic course on AI which led other Chinese universities to adopt AI as a discipline, specifically because China faces challenges in recruiting and maintaining AI engineers and researchers. [21] Over half of the information researchers in the United States have actually been working in the field for over ten years, while roughly the very same percentage of information researchers in China have less than 5 years of experience. Since 2017, less than 30 Chinese Universities produce AI-focused specialists and research study products. [61]:8 Although China went beyond the United States in the variety of research documents produced from 2011 to 2015, the quality of its published papers, as evaluated by peer citations, ranked 34th internationally. [75] China particularly desire to resolve military applications and so the Beijing Institute of Technology, one of China’s premier institutes for weapons research study, recently established the very first children’s curriculum in military AI worldwide. [76]
In 2019, 34% of Chinese students studying in the AI field remained in China for work. [77] According to a database preserved by an American thinktank, the percentage increased to 58% in 2022. [77]
Ethical issues
For the past years, there are conversations about AI safety and ethical concerns in both private and public sectors. In 2021, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology released the first national ethical standard, ‘the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Ethics Code’ on the topic of AI with particular emphasis on user security, data privacy, and security. [78] This file acknowledges the power of AI and fast innovation adjustment by the big corporations for user engagements. The South China Morning Post reported that humans shall remain in full decision-making power and rights to opt-in/-out. [78] Before this, the Beijing Academy of Expert system released the Beijing AI principles requiring essential requirements in long-term research and preparation of AI ethical concepts. [79]
Data security has actually been the most common topic in AI ethical conversation worldwide, and numerous nationwide federal governments have established legislation addressing information personal privacy and security. The Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China was enacted in 2017 aiming to resolve brand-new challenges raised by AI development. [80] [original research?] In 2021, China’s new Data Security Law (DSL) was gone by the PRC congress, establishing a regulative framework categorizing all type of data collection and storage in China. [81] This indicates all tech companies in China are required to categorize their data into categories listed in Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and follow particular standards on how to govern and deal with information transfers to other celebrations. [81]
Judicial system
In 2019, the city of Hangzhou developed a pilot program synthetic intelligence-based Internet Court to adjudicate disagreements connected to ecommerce and internet-related intellectual home claims. [82]:124 Parties appear before the court via videoconference and AI evaluates the proof presented and applies pertinent legal requirements. [82]:124
Because some controversial cases that drew public criticism for their low penalties have been withdrawn from China Judgments Online, there are concerns about whether AI based upon fragmented judicial data can reach objective choices. [83] Zhang Linghan, professor of law at the China University of Political Science and Law, writes that AI-technology business may deteriorate judicial power. [84] Some scholars argued that « increasing party management, political oversight, and lowering the discretionary area of judges are intentional objectives of SCR [clever court reform] » [85]
Leading companies
Leading AI-centric companies and start-ups include Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, SenseTime, 4Paradigm and Yitu Technology. [86] Chinese AI companies iFlytek, SenseTime, Cloudwalk and DJI have gotten attention for facial recognition, sound acknowledgment and drone innovations. [87]
China’s federal government takes a market-oriented method to AI, and has looked for to motivate personal tech companies in developing AI. [25]:281 In 2018, it designated Baidu, Alibaba, iFlytek, Tencent, and SenseTime as « AI champs ». [25]:281
In 2023, Tencent debuted its big language design Hunyuan for business usage on Tencent Cloud. [88]
New leading AI start-ups consist of Baichuan, Zhipu AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax which were applauded by investors as China’s brand-new « AI Tigers » in 2024. [32] 01. AI has likewise been promoted as a leading start-up. [89]
Assessment
Academic Jinghan Zeng argued the Chinese government’s dedication to global AI leadership and technological competitors was driven by its previous underperformance in development which was seen by the CCP as a part of the century of embarrassment. [90] According to Zeng, there are traditionally ingrained causes of China’s anxiety towards securing an international technological dominance – China missed out on both commercial revolutions, the one beginning in Britain in the mid-18th century, and the one that came from America in the late-19th century. [90] Therefore, China’s government desires to make the most of the technological revolution in today’s world led by digital innovation consisting of AI to resume China’s « rightful » place and to pursue the nationwide rejuvenation proposed by Xi Jinping. [90]
A short article released by the Center for a Brand-new American Security concluded that « Chinese government authorities demonstrated remarkably eager understanding of the concerns surrounding AI and international security. This includes knowledge of the U.S. AI policy conversations, » and recommended that « the U.S. policymaking community to similarly prioritize cultivating know-how and understanding of AI developments in China » and « funding, focus, and a determination amongst U.S. policymakers to drive large-scale essential change. » [35] A post in the MIT Technology Review similarly concluded: « China might have unrivaled resources and huge untapped capacity, however the West has world-leading know-how and a strong research study culture. Instead of stress over China’s development, it would be smart for Western nations to focus on their existing strengths, investing greatly in research and education. » [91]
The Chinese federal government’s censorship program has stunted the development of generative expert system [7] [8]
In a 2021 text, the Research Centre for a Holistic Approach to National Security at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations wrote that the development of AI creates challenges for holistic nationwide security, consisting of the threats that AI will increase social stress or have destabilizing results on global relations. [28]:49
Writing from a Chinese Marxist view, academics consisting of Gao Qiqi and Pan Enrong compete that capitalist application of AI will lead to greater oppression of employees and more severe social problems. [28]:90 Gao points out how the development of AI has actually increased the power of platform business like Meta, Twitter, and Alphabet, causing greater capital build-up and political power in less financial actors. [28]:90 According to Gao, the state should be the main accountable star in the area of generative AI (developing new material like music or video). [28]:92 Gao writes that military use of AI risks intensifying military competition between countries and that the effect of AI in military matters will not be limited to one country however will have spillover results. [28]:91
Dialogues between Chinese and Western AI specialists about the existential risk from expert system have occurred. [92]
Public ballot
The Chinese public is normally positive concerning AI. [25]:283 [28]:101 A 2021 study conducted throughout 28 nations discovered that 78% of the Chinese public believes the benefits of AI surpass the threats, the highest of any country in the study. [25]:283 In 2024, a study of elite Chinese university students discovered that 80% agreed or strongly concurred that AI will do more excellent than damage for society, and 31% thought it must be controlled by the government. [93]
Human rights
The widely utilized AI facial recognition has actually raised issues. [94] According to The New York City Times, implementation of AI facial acknowledgment technology in the Xinjiang region to find Uyghurs is « the very first known example of a federal government deliberately utilizing synthetic intelligence for racial profiling, » [95] which is stated to be « one of the most striking examples of digital authoritarianism. » [96] Researchers have found that in China, areas experiencing greater rates of discontent are related to increased state acquisition of AI facial acknowledgment technology, especially by regional community police departments. [97] [98]
Expert system.
Expert system arms race
China Brain Project
Fifth generation computer system
List of artificial intelligence business
Regulation of synthetic intelligence
References
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Further reading
Hannas, William C.; Chang, Huey-Meei, eds. (29 July 2022). Chinese Power and Artificial Intelligence: Perspectives and Challenges (1st ed.). London: Routledge.